The Ontology of Social Systems and the Reality of Paradox
In social science, we often talk about systems—institutions, networks, organisational forms—as frameworks for explaining social phenomena. Yet much of this work remains descriptive or explanatory rather than ontological. To deepen our understanding, we need to clarify what kind of entities social systems are and how paradox and contradiction function within them.
To treat social systems as bounded, static objects is to miss their ontological nature. Social systems exist as emergent, relational entities sustained through collective intentionality—a mode of agency that cannot be reduced to individual intentions aggregated. Raimo Tuomela’s concept of “we-intentions” captures this: social systems are constituted by shared intentions and norms enacted through joint action (Tuomela, 2007).
This collective we underpins social facts, which John Searle famously locates in collective intentionality rather than brute physical fact (Searle, 1995). But collective intentionality is itself a normative phenomenon, grounded in mutual commitments and obligations. Margaret Gilbert’s analysis of joint commitment sharpens this point: social groups persist because participants accept binding mutual responsibilities that create a shared normative field (Gilbert, 1989).
Barry Smith’s framing of social entities as dependent continuants further clarifies how social systems endure over time—not as physical objects but as ongoing patterns of social relations and commitments continuously re-enacted (Smith, 2012). Social systems thus have a processual ontology: their identity depends on repeated social performances and institutional practices, akin to Pierre Bourdieu’s habitus and field, where structures are both constituted by and constitutive of agents’ practices (Bourdieu, 1977).
Emergence is critical here. Social systems exhibit properties irreducible to their individual constituents, consistent with a moderate emergentism advanced by List and Pettit (2011). The feedback loops and dialectical relations between individual agency and social structure produce new qualities and dynamics unpredictable from micro-level interactions alone (List & Pettit, 2011).
Such complexity makes paradox fundamental rather than accidental. The tensions within social systems—the simultaneous demands for coherence and change, unity and differentiation—are not merely epistemic confusions or linguistic tricks. They reveal an ontological paradox intrinsic to social reality itself, resonating with Hegel’s dialectical insight that contradictions are constitutive of being, not simply of thought (Hegel, 1807).
Critical realism’s insistence on stratified reality, as articulated by Bhaskar (1979), supports this view: paradoxes are real features of social structures, arising from the interplay of material conditions and human agency. The limits of language and cognition, emphasized by Rorty (1979), caution against reducing paradox to mere semantic or conceptual error.
In sum, social systems are emergent, relational, and processual entities grounded in collective intentionality and joint commitment. Their constitutive tensions manifest as ontological paradoxes—real contradictions embedded in the very fabric of social life, not artifacts of imperfect knowledge or linguistic insufficiency.
References
Bhaskar, R. (1979). The Possibility of Naturalism: A Philosophical Critique of the Contemporary Human Sciences. Harvester Press.
Bourdieu, P. (1977). Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge University Press.
Gilbert, M. (1989). On Social Facts. Routledge.
Hegel, G. W. F. (1807). Phenomenology of Spirit (A. V. Miller, Trans.). Oxford University Press, 1977.
List, C., & Pettit, P. (2011). Group Agency: The Possibility, Design, and Status of Corporate Agents. Oxford University Press.
Searle, J. R. (1995). The Construction of Social Reality. Free Press.
Smith, B. (2012). Social Entities. In R. M. S. (Ed.), Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology (pp. 153–178). Springer.
Tuomela, R. (2007). The Philosophy of Sociality: The Shared Point of View. Oxford University Press.